Youssef Boutros-Ghali, chair of the IMF’s policy steering committee has spoken out against what he sees as the failure of G20 members to act on their commitments earlier this month to reform of the Fund.
Around the time of the London Summit, both the Financial Times and the Economist spoke out against reforming international financial institutions. They argued that the first concern should be dealing with the financial crisis, not dealing with ‘peripheral’ issues. As Boutros-Ghali puts it, ‘in a crisis, you want to put out the fire and not bother with plans to redecorate the living room.’ Nonetheless, he added that ‘reform needs to be done in a time of crisis’. This is the position I myself have taken.
A recent CEPR report is also far from sanguine:
the proposed quadrupling of IMF resources will have implications for many years to come, even after the world economy recovers. Although the new resources are unlikely to reverse the trend of governments avoiding, whenever possible, the Fund’s lending and influence, they will help to re-establish an unreformed IMF as a major power in economic and decision-making in low-and-middle income countries, with little or no voice for these countries in the IMF’s decisions. This could have long-term implications for growth, development, and social indicators in many countries.
The will to reform the Fund’s wildly disproportionate voting rights seems to be flagging already. This is both concerning and, if we’re honest, unsurprising. Those countries that gain from the status quo have little incentive to push for change. It is easier and more beneficial to sideline these issues of global governance while they focus solidly on domestic economic recovery. This is the kind of short-sighted attitude that has become par-for-the-course when it comes to global governance. Domestic politicians have no need to look beyond the next election and will therefore never side with long-term gain over short-term pain. The same phenomenon can be seen in climate change negotiations or social security reform at the domestic level.
Aside from a benign world dictatorship, or politicians showing genuine leadership, both of which I think we can dismiss, perhaps it is necessary to use a system whereby unpopular or disadvantageous reforms are agreed, locked in and then ‘grandfathered’ into practice some time later, thus—to a degree—reducing the immediate disincentive for politicians to make hard decisions. Politicians do not need to worry so much about upsetting their constituents if the changes they agree are scheduled to come into force some years later. This is by no means a perfect plan – it is slow and open to abuse. But it might be one of the only ways to get around the short-termism of the politics of global governance.
On a more postivie note, Boutros-Ghali also said that:
In future, [the IMF] should vary its policy recipes… “I want an institution that is more involved not only as a global policeman but as a global witchdoctor.”
This is an encouraging confirmation of the Fund’s increasing tendency towards more heterodox economic thinking, though I’m in two minds about whether a ‘witchdoctor’ is quite what we’re looking for.


Apparently, a ’summer of rage’ is being predicted for the UK. Mass protests are expected. The combination of the G20 summit and the likelihood of more ‘wildcat’ industrial strikes, as well as general anger at the financial industry as a whole seems to be causing concern at the highest levels. According to 
